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OF EQUITY, CONTINUATION AND THE DE FACTO MERGER DoCTRINE:
REFLECTIONS ON MISSISS[PPI LAW AND SUCCESSOR LL4,BELrry
Cecile C. Edwards*
Much has been written regarding the proper theories of successor liability.1
Courts and scholars have searched the vagaries of the de facto merger doctrine,
the mere continuation theory, and the many ways a successor might assume the
liabilities of another corporate entity. Even after all this searching, little certain-
ty exists about whether a corporation that purchases another company's business
can or may prevent an unplanned assumption of the liabilities as well. The fail-
ure to address this problem in a uniform way creates uncertainty in the purchase
and sale of any business and therefore increases the transaction costs associated
with those arrangements.2
Courts use several different theories to deal with the questions surrounding the
disposition of liabilities when the assets of a business are transferred from one
owner to another, either by sale or by dissolution. The primary lines of analysis
arise from the exceptions to the general rule that the purchaser of a business is
not liable for the debts of its predecessor. Among the exceptions to the general
rule of non-liability are the de facto merger doctrine and the mere continuation
of the business test. These exceptions, while useful, create a great deal of confu-
sion and often lead to an increase in the expenses associated with the purchase,
sale, or dissolution of a business. The responses to this confusion are varied.
Several noted scholars, including the reporters for the American Law Institute's
Restatement (Third) of Torts, call for a legislative solution to alleviate the confu-
sion arising in this area.' However, a uniform statutory approach has not materi-
* Professor of Law, Mississippi College School of Law.
I. Albert Bates, Jr. et al, Asset Purchases, Successor Liability and Insurance Coverage: Does the Tail
Always Follow the Dog?, 100 W. VA. L. REV. 631 (1998); Jeanette M. Bowers, A Parent Corporation " Potential
Liabilityfor Acts of its Dissolved Missouri Subsidiary Corporation, 53 J. Mo. B. 145 (1997); Steven P. Caley &
Theresa I. Yard, Avoid Buying Trouble: Successor Liability For Products Manufactured Prior To Asset
Acquisition, 67-FEB N.Y. ST. B.J. 30 (1995); Richard L. Cupp Jr., Redesigning Successor Liability, 99 U. ILL.
L. REV. 845 (1999); Michael D. Green, Fairness and Successor Liability: The Limits of the Common Law
Process, 8 KAN. J. L. & PUB. PoL'Y 119 (1998); Frank Fazio, Product Line Successor Liability: Back Through
the Looking-Glass?, 191-JUN N.J. LAW. 24 (1998); Michael D. Green, Successor Liability: The Superiority of
Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 17 (1986); G. William Joyner,
11, Beyond Budd Tire: Examining Corporate Successor Liability in North Carolina, 30 WAKE FOREST L. REv.
889 (1995); Dorit F Kressel, Successor Liability In Products Liability Litigation: Modern Judicial Response To
Traditional Corporate Rules, 4 PROD. LLAB. L.J. 211 (1993); Gary A. Magnarini, Successor Products Liability:
Redefining The "De facto Merger" Exception, 62-MAR Wis. LAW. 18 (1989); Frank William McIntyre, De
facto Merger in Texas: Reports of its Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 2 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REv. 593
(1996); Michael H. Reed, Successor Liability and Bankruptcy Sales, 51 Bus. LAW. 653 (1996); Anthony D.
Shaffer, Successor Liability For the Predecessor s Defective Product: Should Predecessors Have Their Cake
and Eat It Too?, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 1003 (1994); H. Lawrence Tafe, The De Facto Merger Doctrine Comes to
Massachusetts Wherein the Exception to the Rule Becomes the Rule, 42 DEC B. B.J. 12 (1998); J. Maxwell
Tucker, The Clash of Successor Liability Principles, Reorganization Law, and the Just Demand That Relief Be
Afforded Unknown and Unknowable Claimants, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. I (1995); Frederick Tung, Taking Future
Claims Seriously: Future Claims and Successor Liability in Bankruptcy, 49 CASE W RES. L. REV. 435 (1999).
2. Professor Michael Green, in his recent symposium comments, suggested that an expanded successor lia-
bility rule would have serious unintended consequences including increased costs due to the unwillingness of
corporations to purchase other businesses. Green, Fairness and Successor Liability, supra note 1.
3. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCTS LIABILITY §12 reporters' Note cmt. b (1998); Green,
Successor Liability, supra note 1; Mark R. Sarlitto, Note, Recognizing Products Liability Claims at Dissolution:
The Compatibility of Corporate and Tort Law Principles, 87 COLtUM. L. REV. 1048 (1987).
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alized, and courts around the country grapple with these theories and reach var-
ied conclusions.'
The development of the law governing when a successor corporation is liable
for the debts of the predecessor is significant because of its ability to demon-
strate the tension between the need to protect innocent creditors (both in tort and
contract), and the need of corporate managers and owners for certainty when
businesses are purchased, sold, or dissolved. Under traditional corporate law
rules, a corporation is hot liable for the debts of its predecessor unless: (1) the
predecessor expressly or impliedly agreed to assume the liabilities; (2) there was
a de facto merger of the two firms; (3) the successor was a "mere continuation"
of the seller, or; (4) the transaction was fraudulent.' This strict rule began erod-
ing during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Cases from several jurisdictions
began to loosen the traditional exceptions and provide recovery for plaintiffs in
different circumstances.7 This article will argue that some very old cases from
Mississippi contain the key to an appropriate resolution of these issues.
THE MERE CONTINUATION EXCEPTION
The mere continuation exception was initially rather strictly construed. A cor-
poration could not be considered a "mere continuation" of its predecessor unless
only one corporation remained after the transfer of assets and the two corpora-
tions shared the same officers, directors and shareholders." The two primary the-
ories that arose to expand the mere continuation theory were the product line
exception and the continuity of enterprise theory. The product line and continu-
ity of enterprise theories were adopted by a number of courts in the 1980s and
the 1990s. These theories give courts and juries more discretion in allowing lia-
bilities to follow assets. Cases decided by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit dealing with the mere continuation exception illustrate the variety of facts
and theories applied in this context.1" While the federal courts are simply apply-
4. Professor Richard L. Cupp, Jr., took great care counting the states that considered the question of suc-
cessor liability when applying the "mere continuation" exception in a recent article. In this article, Professor
Cupp counts eighteen states that follow the traditional approach to successor liability, and fourteen states that
follow a less restrictive approach. Cupp, supra note I, at 853-855. Fewer courts adopt the de facto merger doc-
trine originally applied to tort creditors in Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F.2d 361, 367 (3d Cir.
1974).
5. Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., Inc., 962 E2d 1169, 1175 (5th Cir. 1992); Mozingo v. Correct Mfg. Corp.,
752 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1985); RESTATEMENT (THI.D) OF TORTS § 12 (1998).
6. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153 (1st Cir. 1974); Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3, 10 (Cal.
1977); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976).
7. Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1153; Ray, 560 P.2d at 10; Turner, 244 N.W2d at 881-82.
8. Weaver v. Nash Int'l, 730 F2d 547 (8th Cir. 1984); Travis v. Harris Corp., 565 F.2d 443 (7th Cir. 1977)
(citing Lopata v. Bemis Co., 383 F. Supp. 342, 345 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
9. Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3, 10; Ramirez v. Armstead Indus., Inc., 431 A.2d 811, 818-19 (N.J. 1981); Garcia
v. Coe Mfg. Co., 933 P2d 243, 248-50 (N.M. 1997); Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1981); Martin v. Abbott Lab., 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash. 1984); Asher v. KCS Int'l, 659 So. 2d 598,
600 (Ala. 1995); Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976); Mozingo v. Correct
Mfg. Corp., 752 F.2d 168, 174 (5th Cir. 1985); Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1153-54 (1st Cir. 1974);
Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Mach. Co., 507 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ohio 1987); Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons
Co., 432 F Supp. 454, 455 (D.S.C. 1977).
10. Russell, 962 F.2d at 1175; Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 174.
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ing state law, their interpretation has great weight because so few state cases
exist within the jurisdiction of the Fifth Circuit."
The problem is well illustrated in the case Mozingo v. Correct Manufacturing
Corp.'" This case involved an alleged defect in a "Skyworker" brand "cherry-
picker" manufactured by the predecessor of Correct Manufacturing
Corporation." Mr. Mozingo was injured while testing the device.1" The
Skyworker was manufactured by a company named Transairco sometime
between 1969 and 1972.5 In 1972, Transairco spun off most of its manufactur-
ing assets including those which manufactured the Skyworker.'" The plaintiff,
Mr. Mozingo was injured in 1977.17 Mr. Mozingo filed suit against Correct
Manufacturing Corporation for damages caused when the boom on the device
failed. 8 He admitted that Correct Manufacturing Corporation did not manufac-
ture the defective product. 9 Mr. Mozingo alleged, however, that Correct
Manufacturing Corporation was liable as the successor to Transairco.
20
The District Judge permitted the question of successor liability to go to the
jury, and the jury found for Mr. Mozingo.2' The Fifth Circuit stated the general
rule that a corporation was not liable for the debts of its predecessor unless one
of the four exceptions was present.2 The four exceptions are as follows: "(1)
when the successor expressly or impliedly agrees to assume the liabilities of the
predecessor; (2) when the transaction may be considered a de facto merger; (3)
when the successor is a 'mere continuation' of the predecessor; or (4) the trans-
action was fraudulent."
23
The court, noting that only the "mere continuation" exception could apply in
this case, examined the three interpretations of the mere continuation exception.
24
Thecourt recognized that the traditional rule provides that a corporation will not
be considered a mere continuation of its predecessor, unless only one corporation
remains after the transfer of assets and the two corporations share the same offi-
cers, directors and shareholders.2 The court then noted that two groups of cases
II. Texas apparently follows the traditional rule, but only two appellate court cases discuss the rule. Both
appellate cases note that Texas has abrogated implied successor liability by statute. McKee v. American Transfer
& Storage, 946 FSupp. 485, 487 (N.D. Tex. 1996); Mudget v. Paxson Mach. Co. 709 S.W2d 755, 758 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1986). Louisiana has no state cases dealing expressly with the issue. In one case, the Louisiana Court of
Appeals discussed the issue, but held the traditional rule inapplicable in Bourque v. Lehmann Lathe, Inc.,
because the case involved an involuntary sale of assets in bankruptcy. 476 So. 2d 1125,1128 (La. Ct. App.
1985). Mississippi has only a few cases that deal with successor liability. They are discussed in the text at
notes 66-123 in section 1I.
12. Mozingo, 752 E2d at 168.
13. Id. at 171.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 173.
16. id.





22. id. at 174.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 174-75.
25. Id. The court cited Weaver v. Nash International, 730 F.2d 547,548 (8th Cir. 1984) and Travis v. Harris
Corp., 565 E2d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1977) as examples of the traditional rule.
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departed from the general rule.2" These two groups of cases adopt either the
"product line theory" '27 or the "continuity of enterprise theory."'28
The Mozingo court characterized the product line theory as a "completely new
exception to the rule of non-liability."29  The court cited Ray v. Alad Corp., 0
which held that a successor corporation which continues to manufacture the
same product under the same name as the predecessor may be held liable for
products liability claims based upon products manufactured by the predecessor. 1
The court said that the product line theory is based on two primary premises. 2
First, the successor corporation, like the predecessor corporation, is in a better
position to spread the risk of loss than the injured plaintiff.' Second, fairness
demands that one who takes the benefits of established goodwill related to a
product should also bear that product's burdens. 4 The court noted that other
jurisdictions had adopted this theory, but raised Erie" doctrine concerns about
adopting a relatively new theory without authority from the state court.36
The court next turned to a discussion of the continuity of enterprise theory.7
The court cited Cyr v. B. Offen & Co.as and Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co.'
for holdings adopting the theory.' The court said that the continuity of enter-
26. Mozingo, 752 F.2dat 175.
27. Id. Professor Cupp states that the following six states currently follow the product line theory: (1)
California, Ray v. Alad, 560 P.2d 3, 10 (Ca. 1977); (2) New Jersey, Ramirez v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 431 A.2d
811, 817 (N.J. 1981); (3) New Mexico, Garcia v. Coe Manufacturing Co., 933 P.2d 243, 248-50 (N.M. 1997);
(4) Pennsylvania, Dawejko v. Jorgensen Steel Co., 434 A.2d 106, 110 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981); and (5)
Washington, Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368, 388 (Wash. 1984). Cupp, supra note 1, at 854 n. 45.
Professor Cupp notes that the Connecticut Supreme Court has not spoken on the issue, but that three lower
courts have applied the product line exception. See, Sullivan v. A.W. Flint Co., No. CV 920339263, 1996 WL
469716, at *7-*8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1996); Kennedy v. Oshkosh Truck Corp., No. CV92 0510394S,
1995 WL 27400, at *2, *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 18, 1995); Copperthite v. Pytlik, No. 59053, 1992 WL
209660, at *4 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1992). Also, Professor Cupp notes that New York holds the successor
liable if it is selling the same product line sold by the predecessor or if it falls within the continuity of enterprise
approach. Cupp, supra note 1, at 854 n. 46. See, e.g., McCaffrey v. Weaver Jack Corp., No. CV 89- 3910, 1992
WL 266923, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 1992) (continuity of enterprise); Rothstein v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline
Co., 664 N.Y.S.2d 213, 220-21 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997) (product line exception); Salvati v. Blaw-Knox Food &
Chem. Equip., Inc., 497 N.Y.S.2d 242, 247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (continuity of enterprise).
28. Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 175. Professor Cupp also states that there are six states which follow the continu-
ity of enterprise approach. Cupp, supra note i, at 854 n.44. The six states are (I) Alabama, Asher v. KCS
International, 659 So. 2d 598, 600 (Ala. 1995); (2) Michigan, Turner v. Bituminous Casualty Co., 244 N.W2d
873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976); (3) Mississippi, Mozingo, 752 E2d at 174-76; (4) New Hampshire, Cyr v. B. Offen
& Co., 501 E2d 1145, 1152-54 (1st Cir. 1974); Ohio, Flaugher v. Cone Automatic Machine Co., 507 N.E.2d
331, 334 (Ohio 1987); and (6) South Carolina, Holloway v. John E. Smith's Sons Co., 432 F. Supp. 454, 455
(D.S.C. 1977). Professor Cupp also notes that New York holds the successor liable if it is selling the same prod-
uct line sold by the predecessor, or if it falls within the continuity of enterprise approach. See. e.g., McCaffrey,
1992 WL 266923, at *2 (continuity of enterprise); Rothstein, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 220-21 (product line exception);
Salvati, 497 N.Y.S.2d at 247 (continuity of enterprise).
29. Mozingo, 752 F.2d at 175.
30. Ray v. Alad Corp., 560 P.2d 3 (Cal. 1977).




35. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
36. Mozingo, 752 E2d at 175.
37. Id.
38. Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F2d 1145, 1153-54 (1st Cir. 1974).
39. Turner v. Bituminous Cas. Co., 244 N.W.2d 873, 881-82 (Mich. 1976).
40. Mozingo, 752 F2d at 175.
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prise theory is simply an expansion of the mere continuation exception to the
general rule of non-liability." Under this theory, the strict requirements of the
traditional theory are broadened and the court will take into account the follow-
ing additional factors:
retention of the same employees; retention of the same supervisory personnel;
retention of the same production facilities in the same physical location; produc-
tion of the same product; retention of the same name; continuity of assets; conti-
nuity of general business operations; and whether the successor holds itself out
as the continuation of the previous enterprise. 2
The court indicated that these cases were close to the traditional exception and
that the district court's instruction regarding continuity of enterprise was not
erroneous.' 3 Therefore, the court adopted the continuity of enterprise test for
Mississippi cases in the Fifth Circuit." Mozingo is rather typical of the successor
liability cases and provided a basic discussion of the issues raised by such cases.
Another prominent case from the Fifth Circuit is Russell v. SunAmerica
Securities, Inc.'" The Russell case involves the use of successor liability theories
to determine whether an action against a successor corporation was barred by a
settlement agreement entered into between the plaintiff and the predecessor.'" In
Russell, the plaintiffs alleged that their injuries were caused by Southmark
Financial Services, Inc.'7 In 1988, the plaintiffs brought suit under federal and
state securities laws, the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
("RICO"), and for common law fraud and breach of contract. 8 In 1989,
SunAmerica agreed to purchase the assets of Southmark but did not agree to
assume its liabilities.' At some point, the plaintiffs entered into a settlement
agreement with Southmark and executed a release that discharged Southmark
from "any and all past, present or future claims."'  On April 30, 1990, based on
the previous agreement between Southmark and the plaintiffs, Southmark was
dismissed as a defendant with prejudice."' The plaintiffs brought suit against
SunAmerica as a successor to Southmark on July 10, 1990.2 The court used the
doctrine of successor liability to determine whether the identities of the two cor-
porations were so closely linked that the dismissal of Southmark with prejudice
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Cyr, 501 F.2d at 1153-54; Bonee v. L & M Constr. Chem., 518 FSupp. 375, 381 (M.D. Tenn.
1981); Trimper v. Bruno-Sherman Corp., 436 F Supp. 349, 350-51 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Holloway v. John E.
Smith's Sons, 432 F. Supp. 454, 455-56 (D.S.C. 1977); Rivers v. Stihl, Inc., 434 So. 2d 766, 771-72 (Ala. 1983);
Turner, 244 N.W.2d at 879).
43. Mozingo, 752 F2d at 175-76.
44. Id. at 176.
45. Russell v. SunAmerica Sec., Inc., 962 F2d 1169 (5th Cir. 1992).
46. Id. at 1174-75.




51. Id. at 1171.
52. Id.
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barred the action against SunAmerica." Applying the continuity of enterprise
theory, the court held that the relationship between Southmark and SunAmerica
was sufficient to bar an action against SunAmerica on the basis of resjudicata.4
Two other cases from the Fifth Circuit bear mention in this area. The first is
Rhynes v. Branick Manufacturing Corp.," in which the court, applying Texas law,
declined to adopt the product line theory of liability in the absence of any indica-
tion that Texas would do so.6 In 1979, the Texas legislature enacted a statutory
provision that some courts have interpreted to permit a purchaser the right to buy
only the assets of the seller.57 This Texas rule was an issue in United States v.
Vernon Home Health Care Agency, Inc.' The court held that the Texas rule did
not apply to a case involving the liability of a purchasing corporation for
Medicare overpayments to the predecessor.' The court stated that "federal law
governs cases involving the rights of the United States arising under a nation-
wide federal program."'  In that case, the United States had provided for succes-
sor liability by regulation.61 Even in the face of the Texas statute, the court
applied the federal rule.62
THE DE FACTO MERGER EXCEPTION
While the Fifth Circuit has not grappled with the de facto merger exception,
other jurisdictions have done so. The de facto merger doctrine originated in the
context of shareholder rights' and was imported into the successor liability con-
text by Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp.64 In Knapp, the plaintiff was
injured by a machine manufactured and sold by Textile Machine Works.6" After
the sale of the machine, but before the injury, Textile Machine Works sold all of
its assets to North American Rockwell Corp. in exchange for North American
Rockwell stock." The Third Circuit, acknowledging that Pennsylvania courts
had not addressed the issue in this context, determined that Pennsylvania would
apply the de facto merger doctrine to the case as a way to appropriately allocate
the risk between the injured plaintiff and the successor corporation.' The de
facto merger doctrine has spread to other jurisdictions and has acquired the fol-
lowing list of factors that courts should consider when applying the doctrine:
53. Id. at 1176-77. The court specifically declined to rule on whether SunAmerica would have any liability
to the plaintiffs under any successor liability doctrine.
54. Id. at 1177.
55. Rhynes v. Branik Mfg. Corp., 629 F2d 409 (5th Cir. 1980).
56. Id. at 410.
57. TEx Bus. Cou. AcT ANN. art. 5.10(B) (West 1980).
58. United States v. Vernon Home Health Care Agency, 21 E3d 693 (5th Cir. 1994).




63. See Rath v. Rath Packing Co., 136 N.W.2d 410 (Iowa 1965); Ferris v. Glen Alden Corp., 143 A.2d 25
(Pa. 1958). But see, Hariton v. Arco Elec., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963) (Delaware rejects the de facto merger doc-
trine in corporate reorganizations affecting shareholder rights).
64. Knapp v. North American Rockwell Corp., 506 F2d 361 (3d Cir. 1974).
65. Id. at 362.
66. Id. at 363.
67. Id. at 369.
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whether (1) there is a continuation of the enterprise of the seller corporation so
that there is continuity of management, personnel, physical location, assets, and
general business operations; whether (2) there is a continuity of shareholders
which results from the purchasing corporation paying for the acquired assets
with shares of its own stock, this stock ultimately coming to be held by the
shareholders of the seller corporation so that they become a constituent part of
the purchasing corporation; whether (3) the seller corporation ceases its ordi-
nary business operations, liquidates, and dissolves as soon as legally and practi-
cally possible; and whether (4) the purchasing corporation assumes those oblig-
ations of the seller ordinarily necessary for the uninterrupted continuation of
normal business operations of the seller corporation.as
These factors are helpful in determining whether a corporation has engaged in a
de facto merger with another. The question is whether the jurisdiction recognizes
the concept at all.
While the de facto merger issue is almost always included in the list of excep-
tions to the general rule of non-liability, the fate of the de facto merger doctrine
is clouded in Mississippi and the Fifth Circuit for several reasons. One of the
reasons that the doctrine is somewhat ambiguous in Mississippi is that
Mississippi has adopted the Revised Model Business Corporation Act
("RMBCA")." This act provides several methods for combining businesses. T" In
the comments to the RMBCA, the reporter stated that the drafters intended that
each of the methods used to accomplish corporate combination or sale should
have independent legal significance.71 In other words, each method provided by
the act would be independent of the other. The fact that a sale of assets for stock
followed by dissolution would have the same effect as a merger should not
require compliance with the merger provisions. These comments were not
attached to the provisions passed by the Mississippi Legislature, and it is unclear
what inference a Mississippi court would draw from the comments. Further,
even if a court were to consult the comments to the RMBCA, it is unclear
whether the de facto merger doctrine would apply to questions of liability to
creditors rather than shareholders. Neither the Mississippi Supreme Court nor
the Fifth Circuit has addressed the issue.
The fate of de facto merger doctrine is also clouded in Texas where the legisla-
ture enacted a provision that was apparently intended to abrogate the de facto
68. Cargill, Inc. v. Beaver Coal & Oil Co., 676 N.E.2d 815, 818 (Mass. 1997) (citing In re Acushaiet River,
712 E Supp. 1010, 1015 (D. Mass. 1989)).
69. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-1.01 (1999).
70. MISS. CODE AN. §§ 79-4-11.01, -12.01 (1999).
71. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT ANN. § 11.01 cmt. 2 (1993) (Supp. 1997).
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merger doctrine for corporations incorporated under Texas law." The Fifth
Circuit is bound in Erie73 cases by Texas' interpretation of its statute. As dis-
cussed above, it is not so bound where the federal question is presented, but in
other cases the issue is still unsettled. This article will not attempt to examine
Texas law, but will only note the concern. Certainly, the de facto merger doctrine
is a valid, albeit undeveloped, legal theory in Mississippi.
THE MISSISSIPPI CASES
While Mississippi is not well known for its large body of corporate law, some
of its most interesting equitable and legal language occurs in some very old cases
involving corporate reorganizations. Usually these reorganizations had the effect
of terminating the rights of creditors while preserving the assets in another cor-
poration. Using law, equity and common sense, these thoughtful cases demon-
strate the proper analysis for cases involving claims against corporations dis-
solved to avoid foreseeable debts.
On December 2, 1901, the Mississippi Supreme Court encountered its first
questions regarding the liability of a successor corporation for the debts of its
predecessor.74 In Morrison v. American Snuff Co.7" and Vicksburg & Yazoo City
Telephone Co. v. Citizens' Telephone Co.,76 the court found successor corpora-
tions liable for the debts of their predecessors."' Morrison involved the legisla-
tive consolidation of several corporations. 8 The court held that when corpora-
tions consolidate, the new corporation becomes liable for the debts of the old
corporation-at least to the extent of the property of the old corporation held by
the new.79 While this case is not directly on point, the rationale regarding equity
and fairness in the reorganization of corporations has some bearing on an appro-
priate approach to corporate reorganization.
In Citizens', the court was faced with a situation in which one corporation pur-
chased the assets of another and continued its business." The purchasing corpo-
72. The Texas legislature, apparently in response to Western Resources Life Insurance Co. v Gerhardt, 553
S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977), a case imposing liability on a successor, adopted the following provision in
its corporate law:
A disposition of any, all, or substantially all, of the property and assets of a corporation, whether or
not it requires the special authorization of the shareholders of the corporation, effected under
Section A of this article or under Article 5.09 of this Act or otherwise (i) is not considered to be a
merger or conversion pursuant to this Act or otherwise; and (2) except as otherwise expressly pro-
vided by another statute, does not make the acquiring corporation, foreign corporation, or other enti-
ty responsible or liable for any liability or obligation of the selling corporation that the acquiring
corporation, foreign corporation, or other entity did not expressly assume.
TEX Bus. CoRP. AcT, art. 5.10(B) (1999). See also, McIntyre, supra note I (arguing that the Texas legislature
should repeal or amend this provision).
73. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
74, Morrison v. American Snuff Co., 30 So. 723 (Miss. 1901); Vicksburg & Yazoo City Tel. Co. v. Citizens'
Tel. Co., 30 So. 725 (Miss. 1901).
75. Morrison, 30 So. at 723.
76. Citizens', 30 So. at 725.
77. Morrison, 30 So. at 725; Citizens', 30 So. at 728.
78. Morrison, 30 So. at 723.
79. At the time of this case, consolidation was by legislative authority and not by statute. No mention of the
debts of the corporation was made in the enactment. Today, the statute provides that the surviving corporation
in a merger is liable for all the debts of the merging corporations. Miss. CODE ANN., § 79-4-11.06.
80. Citizens', 30 So. at 726.
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ration failed to honor a contract between the selling corporation and the
plaintiff.8 ' More specifically, Standard Telephone Construction Company
("Standard"), the predecessor of the Vicksburg & Yazoo City Telephone
Company ("Vicksburg & Yazoo") entered into a contract with the Citizens'
Telephone Company ("Citizens"') in 1897.82 The purpose of the contract was to
allow and encourage Standard to build long distance telephone lines throughout
Mississippi and Louisiana and to connect those long distance lines to the local
phone service in Vicksburg.' The contract provided that Standard could place its
lines on any poles owned by Citizens', and that Citizens' would furnish a place
on its telephone exchange for Standard's long distance service.8" The contract
also provided that Standard would not be required to pay any charge for the use
of the poles or the exchange.8" The contract was to last for ten years and was
binding on successors."
Standard built its long distance service in Vicksburg and placed its long dis-
tance equipment in Citizens' exchange in accordance with the contract.8 The
parties honored the contract for some time, and then Standard was acquired by
Vicksburg & Yazoo.' Vicksburg & Yazoo honored the agreement as a successor
and assignee of Standard, and the parties continued the arrangement in accor-
dance with the contract." At some time thereafter, Citizens' sold all of its assets
and business to Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Company ("Cumberland")
who took over all of Citizens' telephone business."0 Cumberland refused to
honor the contract between Standard (now Vicksburg & Yazoo) and Citizens'."
Vicksburg & Yazoo brought this action to enforce the contract. 2 The court held
that while the transaction at issue was not technically a merger or a consolida-
tion, the effect was the same, and Vicksburg & Yazoo was entitled to damages for
breach of contract against Cumberland."
In 1911, the court considered a case involving an out-of-state corporation that
had dissolved and reorganized without paying a debt to a creditor." In Mahaffey
81. Id. at 725.











93. Id. at 728. The court stated:
This bill, whilst charging no consolidation or merger when properly understood, nevertheless does
charge that the dealing between these two corporations has resulted practically, to all intents and
purposes, in exactly the same conditions, so far as creditors of the Citizens' Telephone Company and
its property are concerned, as would have resulted had there been consolidation. We think the same
principle which applies in favor of the simple contract creditor against a consolidated corporation,
enabling him to subject, in the hands of that consolidated company, property of a constituent corpo-
ration received by the consolidated company (such constituent corporation being debtor of the sim-
ple contract creditor), will apply in cases like this.
94. Mahaffey Co. v. Russell & Butler, 54 So. 807 (Miss. 1911).
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Co. v. Russell & Butler,"5 the court stated, "One corporation cannot, to the preju-
dice of its creditors, give away its assets to another corporation; nor can one cor-
poration defeat the creditors of another by the purchase of its assets, even for
value, unless such purchase is bona fide." 8 This case involved the Mahaffey Co.,
a Wisconsin corporation, which was dissolved in 1907.97 Later that same year, a
new corporation of the same name was formed in Illinois by the shareholder of
the earlier dissolved corporation.98 The new corporation engaged in the same
business as the former corporation.99 The court held that the purchasing corpora-
tion is liable for the debts of the selling corporation to the extent of the value of
the assets received by it.1"' The legacy of this case serves us today as we attempt
to balance the rights of creditors and the rights of business owners who wish to
reorganize or discontinue their businesses without government interference.
In Meridian Light & Railway Co. v. Catar,°' the court protected the rights of
an injured passenger upon the reorganization of a streetcar company. In
Meridian Light, the court eloquently stated, "[Nleither law nor equity will permit
one corporation to take all the property of another, deprive it of the means of
paying its debts, enable it to dissolve its corporate existence, and place itself
practically beyond the reach of creditors, without assuming its liabilities.""0 2
In December of 1900, the Meridian Street Railway & Power Company owned
an unprofitable street railway doing business in Meridian, Mississippi.1 3 The
plaintiff was injured at some time prior to December 1, 1900. ' In December of
1900, the officers, directors, stockholders and bondholders-who were the same
people-contracted to sell the assets and stock of the corporation to Stoutz,
Ambrecht & McAlpine."' Although no transfer of the property was made,
Stoutz, Ambrecht & McAlpine took possession of the business and proceeded to
operate the street railway.0 ' The new corporation, Meridian Light & Railway
Company, was formed in February of 1901 .07 In March of 1901, Meridian Street
Railway & Power Company conveyed its property to a trustee who conveyed it to
the new corporation."r While the details of the ownership of the new corpora-
tion are not completely clear, the court indicated that the new corporation was
owned and controlled by substantially the same persons who had controlled the
old corporation. ' The court noted that one of the largest shareholders of the old
95. Id. at 807.




100. Id. The court rejected the lower court's jury instruction that the new corporation will be liable for all the
debts of the old. This court made it clear that under the theory of this case, the new corporation was liable for
the debts of the old only to the extent the new corporation acquired assets of the old. Id.
101. Meridian Light & Ry. Co. v. Catar, 60 So. 657 (Miss. 1912).
102. Id. at 658 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 657.
104. Id. at 658.




109. Id. at 658.
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corporation, a Mr. Kamper, became the owner of ninety-five percent of the stock
of the new corporation. " '
The plaintiff in Meridian Light alleged that she was injured due to the negli-
gence of the old corporation.1 " She instituted suit against the old and the new
corporations, taking judgment against the old corporation and dismissing her suit
against the new corporation without prejudice. ' She then brought suit in equity
to collect the judgment from the assets of the old corporation in the hands of the
new corporation.' The plaintiff advanced three theories upon which the new
corporation would be responsible for the debts of the old:"'
(a) That the transaction by which the assets of the old company were transferred
to the new company was a merger; (b) that the new company took the property
in trust for the payment of the debts of the old company; (c) that the pretended
sale of the assets of the old company was a fraudulent scheme to hinder and
delay creditors of the old company in the collection of their debts."'
The defendant's position was that Stoutz, Ambrecht & McAlpine purchased the
property in good faith for fair value and without notice of the plaintiff's claim."'
The court looked past the form of the transactions to the substance of the
process."' It found that the ultimate goal of the transactions in the case was to
promote and organize a new company."8 The new company was to be a reincar-
nation of the old company, clothed with the powers and franchises of the old
company; the only change in identity being the name."9 The court here reasoned
that the transaction in this case was tantamount to a consolidation.'20 The court
stated:
The agreement and the whole scheme was to obtain the property of the old cor-
poration by paying the stockholders the purchase price-not to be paid by the
stockholders to the corporation, but to be kept by the stockholders as their own.
While it may be conceded that the company is but another name for the stock-
holders, it is nevertheless patent in the present case that the stockholders were
taken care of as individuals, and the corporation and its creditors were frankly
ignored.' 2'
The court held that the new corporation was liable for the debts of the old.' 2
This court saw that the equities involved favored allowing the plaintiff to recover














MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
corporation. '23 Here, the court looked to the substance of the transaction and
found that it would be inequitable to deny the plaintiff recovery against the assets
of the old corporation in the hands of the new corporation. 2'
In 1931, the Mississippi Supreme Court considered another case involving suc-
cessor liability. 2 ' In Mississippi Cottonseed Products, Co. v. Planters
Manufacturing Co.,12 the court considered the reorganization of several corpora-
tions into one and held that the assets of the old corporation that had moved into
the hands of the new one were held in trust for the creditors of the old.' In
Cottonseed Products, the plaintiff, Planter's Manufacturing Company, held a
deed of trust on property, including crops, owned by the grantor.'28 The grantor
of the deed of trust sold cotton and cotton seed to the Hollandale Cotton Oil
Mill. "' The proceeds of the sale were paid to the grantor rather than to the plain-
tiff.'30 Plaintiff filed suit against the Hollandale Cotton Oil Mill to recover the
value of the cotton and seed purchased by the Hollandale Cotton Oil Mill. 3
After this suit was filed, but before trial and judgment, the owners of the
Hollandale Cotton Oil Mill and the Mississippi Cottonseed Products Company
decided to reorganize the corporations so that the businesses would all be a part
of one entity instead of several.
32
In furtherance of this plan, the Hollandale Cotton Oil Mill transferred all of its
assets to Mississippi Cottonseed Products Company on July 31, 1927.'" The
contract recited that the transactions were intended to change "the form of the
operation and not its substance."' 3' Later that year, the Hollandale Cotton Oil
Mill was dissolved by action of its shareholders." The plaintiff received judg-
ment against the Hollandale Cotton Oil Mill and sought to enforce it against the
assets then held by Mississippi Cottonseed Products Company.'
36 Mississippi
Cottonseed Products Company asserted that it was a purchaser in good faith for
value and without notice and should not be responsible for the debts of
Hollandale Cotton Oil Mill.'37 The court noted that the two corporations had
common directors and that Mississippi Cottonseed Products Company knew of
the litigation when it entered into the transaction.'" Consequently, the court
affirmed the chancellor's ruling that the assets of the Hollandale Cotton Oil Mill
in the hands of Mississippi Cottonseed Products Company were subject to the
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Mississippi Cottonseed Products, Co. v. Planters Mfg. Co., 132 So. 96 (Miss. 1931).
126. Id. at 96.
127. Id. at 100.
128. Id. at 97-98.
129. Id.







137. Id. at 99.
138. ld.
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judgment of the plaintiff.'3 The court explained that the actions here, which
were designed to unite several corporations under common control, did not con-
stitute a bona fide purchase for value without notice. 4 The court held that the
assets of the old corporation were held in trust for creditors by Mississippi
Cottonseed Products Company."'
These venerable cases indicate a common sense approach to the problem of
successor liability."' The corporation, as an entity, had just come into its own in
American law, and the Mississippi court was adapting its law to a developing
medium. In each of these very old cases, the judgment of the court is based
upon notions of equity and good sense. The court looked to the substance of the
transaction and not to its form. While issues of substance over form are inher-
ently subjective, the court's reasoning incorporated several elements that could
be used to determine when liabilities should pass from the predecessor to the
successor." These elements include (1) the transfer of the essential assets of a
business from one owner to another; (2) the same or a group of the same owners
participating in both entities; (3) the continuation of the same type of business;
and (4) the equitable nature of the claim."'
Interestingly, these factors are very similar to developed factors that apply to
the de facto merger exception and those described by courts which apply the
continuity of enterprise definition of the mere continuation exception. Like the
courts that adopt the continuity of enterprise theory, the Mississippi court, in
these cases, adopted a flexible approach to the problem. This is a wise and sensi-
ble concept. While the justices who decided these cases might be surprised by
the types of actions brought today, they would probably continue to look for
ways to balance the rights of the injured creditor and the entrepreneurial business
owner.
Mississippi is a state with a legal history steeped in the concept of equity. The
privilege of corporate existence is one that should be available to encourage eco-
nomic development and prosperity in the state. At the same time, the law should
not permit this privilege to be abused at the expense of injured consumers and
creditors who, in good faith and with or without knowledge, interact with the
corporation.
In a recent case, Delaware's Chancellor Allen noted that "if the corporation
law does not treat these possible contingencies [of compensation to persons
139. Id.
140. Id. at 99-100.
141. Id. at 100.
142. Other, more modem Mississippi cases exist and do not contradict the above discussed cases; they simply
reaffirm the analysis and logic. Morris v. Macione, 546 So. 2d 969 (Miss. 1989) (holding the new corporation
formed by shareholders of old corporation to avoid contract was liable for contract to the same extent as the
old); West Ctr. Apartments Ltd. v. Keyes, 371 So. 2d 854 (Miss. 1979) (holding that a limited partnership which
purchased all the assets of an apartment complex liable for the debts of the corporation); Hood Ind. Inc. v.
King, 255 So. 2d 912 (Miss. 1971) (holding a successor corporation liable for the entire contract of the prede-
cessor where successor assumed part of the contract).
143. Morrison v. American Snuff Co., 30 So. 723 (Miss. 1901); Vicksburg & Yazoo City Tel. Co. v. Citizens'
Tel. Co., 30 So. 725, 726 (Miss. 1901); Mahaffey Co. v. Russell & Butler, 54 So. 807, 808 (Miss. 1911);
Meridian Light & Ry. Co. v. Catar, 60 So. 657, 658-59 (Miss. 1912); Cottonseed Prod., 132 So. at 99.
144. See Morrison, 30 So. at 723; Citizens', 30 So. at 726; Mahaffey, 54 So. at 808; Meridian Light, 60 So. at
658-59; Cottonseed Prod., 132 So. at 99.
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injured by defective products or by undiscovered and actionable environmental
injury] responsibly, it can be expected that other legal doctrines, such as succes-
sor liability doctrines, will be stretched and shaped to address them."" 5 This
statement demonstrates the understanding that equity is a critical concept that
should not be abandoned by the courts in attempting to articulate fixed rules to
address constantly changing problems. The Mississippi court's analysis of this
issue is still valid today."' The Mississippi court very eloquently stated the rule
when it said, "[N]either law nor equity will permit one corporation to take all the
property of another, deprive it of the means of paying its debts, enable it to dis-
solve its corporate existence, and place itself practically beyond the reach of
creditors, without assuming its liabilities."'47
145. In re RegO, Co. 623 A.2d 92, 96 (Del. Ch. 1992).
146. Meridian Light, 60 So. at 658.
147. Id.
